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Abstract. Do neurobiologists aim to discover natural kinds? I address this 
question in this chapter via a critical analysis of classification practices 
operative across the 43-year history of research on long-term potentiation 
(LTP). I suggest that this 43- year history supports the idea that the 
structure of scientific practice surrounding LTP research has remained an 
obstacle to the discovery of natural kinds. 
 
1. Introduction. A unique aspect of being trained by Peter Machamer is the importance he 
places on understanding scientific practices, providing descriptively accurate accounts of 
those practices and teasing out the interesting philosophical implications. He also 
encourages his students to gain hands-on experience in those areas of science of interest to 
them. My experience working in a neurobiology laboratory as a graduate student in 
combination with his mentoring have been invaluable to my thinking on a host of 
philosophical issues, including the one I take up in this chapter: the relationship between 
neurobiological kinds and scientific practice. 
To provide some relevant background, in a paper in 2009, I described an 
observation I made while undertaking research in a neurobiological laboratory. I worked in 
the field of synaptic plasticity, the ability of synapses to undergo changes in response to 
patterns of electrical activity, which is thought to underlie learning and memory.  I noticed 
                                                            
1The author would like to thank Uljana Feest for helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper and Floh Thiels and Peter Machamer for many interesting and helpful discussions about 
LTP as a case study.  
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that neuroscience affords investigators the freedom to produce forms of synaptic plasticity 
in a plurality of different ways, using different patterns of afferent stimulation. Given that 
different stimulation protocols could potentially recruit different mechanisms, it was an 
open question whether phenomena produced in different laboratories using different 
protocols were the same phenomenon or different phenomena. 
One of the examples I used in my paper to illustrate the “multiplicity of 
experimental protocols” was long-term potentiation (LTP), which is generally defined as an 
activity-dependent increase in the strength of a synapse. I restricted my focus to then 
contemporary investigations of the role of a single protein kinase cascade in LTP, the 
extracellular-signal regulated kinase (ERK), and provided evidence that in response to 
different LTP induction protocols (e.g., theta-burst, high-frequency stimulation), all which 
investigators claimed could be used to successfully induce LTP, the kinase responded 
differently. I used this as a basis to suggest that it was a live possibility that different 
investigators who used different LTP induction protocols to investigate the mechanisms of 
LTP were actually investigating different phenomena produced by different mechanisms 
rather than the same phenomenon produced by the same or different mechanisms. In other 
words, given the structure of experimental practice, it was unclear if LTP was one kind or 
many kinds. 
Some questions that I did not ask in the 2009 paper, however, were: (1) Do LTP 
researchers themselves take different instances of LTP to be the same kind of phenomenon 
or different phenomena? (2) Is there consensus in the field about how to “lump” or “split” 
the phenomena? (3) Is the multiplicity of experimental protocols an obstacle to the 
discovery of kinds that track actual divisions in the causal structure of the world (i.e., so-
called “natural kinds”)? 
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In this chapter, I engage in an historical analysis of LTP in order to provide at least 
some preliminary answers to these questions. I begin in Section 2 with an analysis of two 
strategies that have been put forward in the philosophical literature on mechanisms for 
revising scientific taxonomies, what I will refer to simply as (a) the “natural kinds strategy” 
(Craver 2002) and (b) the “conventional kinds” strategy (Craver 2009). In Section 3, I use 
these strategies in combination with some conceptual tools for thinking about LTP 
experiments in order to answer the aforementioned questions. 
 
2. Two competing constraints on scientific taxonomies. It is widely accepted that a 
primary aim of neuroscience is to describe the mechanisms that produce phenomena of 
interest (e.g., Bechtel 2008; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Craver 2007). Implicit in 
this account of mechanistic explanation is a characterization of scientific progress in which 
kinds of phenomena and the mechanisms productive of those phenomena change over time. 
The basic idea is that sciences like neuroscience begin by characterizing phenomena and 
organizing them into groups on the basis of detectable surface features. As empirical 
inquiry yields data concerning the mechanisms that produce these phenomena, revisions are 
made with the aim of accommodating that taxonomy to the mechanistic structure of the 
world. This process is iterative; as more is found out about the mechanisms underlying 
phenomena of interest, further revisions to the taxonomy are possible (e.g., Bechtel 2008; 
Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Craver 2007, 2009). This view is consistent with the idea 
that sciences like neuroscience have realist aims; they aim to provide explanations of 
phenomena that reflect “how actually” those phenomena are produced in the natural world. 
In doing so, they approximate towards scientific taxonomies that reflect real divisions of 
kinds that correspond to the mechanistic structure of the world (See Craver 2006). 
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Areas of science that seek to accommodate their taxonomies of kinds to the 
mechanistic structure of the world may be described as being engaged in a search for so- 
called “natural kinds” (Craver 2002, 2007; 2009). In an early paper, Carl Craver (2002), 
noted that cognitive neuroscientists seemed to uphold a sufficient criterion for natural 
kindhood that he dubbed the “No Dissociable Realization (NDR)” condition.2 On this 
condition, “instances of a natural kind have one and only one realizer” and “if there are two 
distinct realizers for a putative instance of a kind, there are really two kinds, one for each 
realizer” (Craver 2002, 962). The example that Craver provides to illustrate how this 
condition operates in practice is memory research. Although neuroscientists originally 
believed that memory was a single kind of phenomenon, findings from lesion studies and 
research on subjects with selective brain damage revealed that declarative memory depends 
on different brain structures than procedural memory. In light of these findings, the 
category of memory was split into two groups of phenomena. Further findings about 
memory mechanisms have prompted further subdivisions in the taxonomy of memory (e.g., 
Kandel and Squire 2008; Sweatt 2009). These and other examples of taxonomic practices 
in action (e.g., Bechtel 2008) lend support to the idea that cognitive neuroscientists 
implement the NDR condition when revising the taxonomy of kinds of memory. Thus, in 
instances where empirical inquiry yields findings that indicate that the current taxonomy of 
neurobiological kinds does not correspond to neural architecture, the taxonomy is revised 
so as to ensure such correspondence. 
Craver (2009), however, offers an alternative account of the kinds of criteria that 
inform “taxonomic revisions” in neuroscience that is also compatible with mechanistic 
accounts of neuroscientific explanation. Whereas the NDR condition is consistent with the 
                                                            
2I am using this condition that Craver puts forward in his 2002 paper as a heuristic because 
I think it gets something right about how some neuroscientists conceive of double dissociation 
experiments and what can be accomplished by using them. 
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idea that neuroscientists treat the world as “an objective arbiter among competing 
taxonomies of kinds” (e.g., of memory) and that their explanatory interests play no role in 
shaping the kinds they ultimately discover, if we consider the situation from another 
perspective, claims Craver, we become privy to the fact that investigators themselves, 
rather than the world, determine when two kinds of phenomena or two kinds of 
mechanisms are different or the same. Consider again the declarative and procedural 
memory case. Empirical findings across animal and human studies indicate that declarative 
memory depends on structures in the medial temporal lobe and procedural memory 
depends on the basal ganglia. However, the first thing to notice is that the kinds of findings 
supporting this division emanate from different kinds of brains—animal and human 
brains—that differ from each other anatomically and mechanistically. Further, within a 
given human population and within the context of even a single experiment no two 
hippocampi or basal ganglia are alike—they vary in terms of a number of structural and 
constitutive details (e.g., overall shape of brain area, cell number, numbers of synaptic 
connections, intracellular and extracellular molecular concentrations). Variations in 
behavioral performance and gross brain activity (e.g., BOLD signal) across subjects are 
also common in experiments in cognitive neuroscience.  
The aforementioned differences could all be taken, from the perspective of an 
investigator, to correspond to different joints of nature. However, from the perspective of 
scientists, to acknowledge such differences as relevant for building a scientific 
classification system would result in an unwieldy taxonomy of kinds that would contain as 
many different kinds as there are different individuals (either animals or humans). This 
would make the taxonomy wildly intractable and bar the kind of generality that 
neuroscientists desire for their explanations. Investigators must instead strike a delicate 
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balance between “characterizing [a] mechanism very abstractly”, which “potentially 
glosses over sub-kinds of mechanism” and “characterizing [a] mechanism in maximal 
detail”, which “threatens to make each particular mechanism a kind unto itself” (Craver 
2009, 587; See also Craver 2014). 
Striking such a balance is, in fact, what cognitive neuroscientists may be 
characterized as doing. The taxonomic division between procedural and declarative 
memory abstracts away from certain differences while acknowledging others. The upshot is 
that rather than adhering strictly to developing taxonomies to directly mirror the causal 
structure of the world, “judgments about whether two mechanisms are mechanisms of the 
same kind rely ineliminably on judgments by people (in concert) about the appropriate 
degree of abstraction required for the problem at hand” (Craver 2014, 589). In other words, 
depending upon what the aims of inquiry are, be they explanation, prediction or 
intervention, the way investigators carve up the world will be aligned with their goals. 
Even if we acknowledge, as Craver does, that conventional factors play a role in the 
development of our scientific taxonomies, this does not mean that investigators in 
neuroscience are not still aiming independently or collectively to discover something like 
or close enough (from their perspectives) to natural kinds. Craver seems sympathetic to this 
idea (See for example, Kendler, Zachar and Craver 2011). However, as I aim to show via 
an investigation of some relevant highlights of the 43-year history of LTP research, 
sometimes experimental practice is not conducive to the realization of this goal and 
investigators end up discovering kinds that are closer to the conventional kinds (antirealist) 
rather than natural kinds (realist) end of the kinds continuum (Craver 2009). 
 
3. LTP: One kind or many? Since at least the early 20th century psychologists and 
physiologists hypothesized that associative forms of learning required changes in how 
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neurons communicate with each other (See Kandel and Spencer 1968). In 1940, the 
psychologist Donald O. Hebb, proposed a mechanism for such changes. Hebb claimed that 
when two cells, A and B, which communicate across a synapse under normal conditions, 
undergo a period of repeated and concurrent activation, the result is a strengthening of the 
connection between the two cells, exhibited by a subsequent change in the way cell A 
excites cell B (Hebb, 1949). According to Hebb, each learning event is accompanied by a 
brief associated activation of two neurons that comprise a synapse, which results in the 
memory of that event being stored in the form of a physiological change at that synapse. 
Although Hebb’s proposed mechanism for learning, as one among several “cellular-
connection theories of learning” (Kandel and Spencer 1968, 68), had many supporters, 
during the 1950s-1960s, investigators tried to produce activity-dependent Hebbian-like 
changes at several nervous system synapses (e.g., spinal cord, lateral geniculate nucleus) 
with limited success.3 In 1966, however, in the context of investigating the physiology of 
the dentate gyrus in the hippocampus of adult anesthetized rabbits, Terge Lømo observed 
an artificially induced physiological equivalent of a strengthening in synaptic efficacy 
much like the one Hebb had described (See Lømo 2003). After applying a brief yet 
repetitive stimulation of “one-second bursts of high-frequency (100 Hz “tetanic”) 
stimulation” to perforant path fibers that project from the entorhinal cortex to the dentate 
gyrus, he recorded, extracellularly, an enduring observable increase in the amplitude above 
baseline of the evoked field potentials of post-synaptic dentate granule cells. This finding 
prompted him and his colleagues to further investigate the phenomenon (e.g., Bliss & 
                                                            
3Little work had been done to study cortical synaptic plasticity in the mammalian brain 
due in part to technological limitations (Kandel and Spencer 1968, 85-86).  However, quite a bit 
of work had been undertaken to induce changes in synaptic efficacy in the invertebrate, Aplysia 
depilans (Kandel and Spencer 1968). Early work on Aplysia indicated that activity-dependent 
changes in synaptic strength primarily involved pre-synaptic (e.g., changes in neurotransmitter 
release) as opposed to post-synaptic mechanisms (Kandel and Spencer 1968; See also Sweatt 
2016). 
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Lømo 1970; Bliss & Gardner-Medwin 1971) and culminated in the publication of a now 
famous paper that introduced the scientific community to “a long-lasting potentiation of 
synaptic transmission” (Bliss and Lømo, 1973)—the phenomenon later renamed “long-
term potentiation” (LTP). 
In order to produce LTP in the dentate area, Bliss and Lømo selected two locations 
in the hippocampus in which to place stimulating electrodes. One electrode was placed in 
the lateral perforant path and was used to deliver test pulses (0.1 msec, with maximum 
amplitude of 100 V) prior to LTP induction. The second electrode was placed in the medial 
perforant path and used to deliver LTP-inducing stimulation. They selected two locations 
from which to record extracellularly: (1) the cell body layer, where they recorded 
population spikes and (2) the dendritic layer, from which they recorded excitatory post-
synaptic potentials. Once the stimulating and recording electrodes were at their desired 
locations in the brain, they applied test pulses consisting of “single shocks at a fixed 
strength, repeated at intervals of 2-3 sec[onds]” (Bliss and Lømo 1973, 334). Responses 
were recorded at regular intervals for up to 30 minutes, “with average responses based on 
20 or 30 consecutive single responses” (Bliss and Lømo 1973, 334). A “sequence of 
conditioning trains” was then delivered at “intervals of 30 min or more”. In each 
experiment they applied “one or more conditioning trains” with the trains delivered at “10-
20/sec[onds] for 10-15 sec[onds] or at 100/sec[ond] for 3-4 sec[onds]” (Bliss and Lømo 
1973, 331). 
Bliss and Lømo investigated several parameters of dentate granule cell responses, 
which they measured, following application of LTP-inducing conditioning trains to 
perforant path fibers: (1) changes in the amplitude of the population EPSP above average 
baseline response to test pulses;  (2) changes in the peak of the amplitude of the population 
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spike above baseline response to test pulses; and (3) latency of the population spike from 
post-conditioning test pulses to initial peak of the population spike. Across 15 experiments, 
they determined that “all three parameters were potentiated in 29% of the experiments” 
(1973, 331) they conducted. As evidence that they had detected a bona fide potentiation, 
they pointed to the fact that (1) the amplitude of the population EPSP increased in 43% of 
all experiments, (2) the population spike increased in 40% of all experiments and (3) a 
reduction in latency of the population spike occurred in 57% of all experiments. Their 
interpretation of the results was that “two independent mechanisms [were] responsible for 
[the] long-lasting potentiation” that they observed, namely: “(a) an increase in the 
efficiency of synaptic transmission at the perforant path synapses” and “(b) an increase in 
the excitability of the granule cell population” (1973, 332).  
Immediately on the heels of Bliss and Lømo’s discovery, other investigators began 
producing LTP in their laboratories. The number of publications directed at understanding 
the phenomenon and its mechanisms exceeded 3000 by 1999 and 6000 by 2004 (See 
Sweatt 2016). Before considering some of the details of LTP research during this historical 
timeframe that is relevant to the question of what kind of kind LTP is, it is relevant to first 
identify some general features of LTP experiments and relate them to the concepts of 
natural and conventional kinds described in the previous section. 
Experimentation consists of two stages (a) data production and (b) data 
interpretation (e.g., Woodward 2003). In LTP experiments, data production may be further 
subdivided into two stages: (1) a design stage in which an experiment is designed and a 
stimulation paradigm and subprotocol for producing LTP are selected and (2) an 
implementation stage in which the experimental design is carefully instantiated across each 
individual experiment. The immediate output of each individual experiment (or 
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implementation of the experimental design) is an individual data point or set of data points. 
Investigators appeal to these data in order to adjudicate among competing hypotheses about 
LTP (e.g., hypotheses about its phenomenological features, its synaptic and cellular and 
molecular mechanisms) (See Sullivan 2009). 
As was mentioned above, in the early stages of developing a scientific taxonomy, 
investigators group together kinds of phenomena that they take to be similar in terms of 
observable features. Taxonomies are subsequently revised in response to discoveries 
pertaining to the mechanisms productive of those phenomena. Thinking about the 
aforementioned features of LTP experiments provides additional insights into the processes 
that contribute to stabilizing scientific taxonomies and the phenomena to which they 
correspond. Bliss and Lømo selected an experimental design and sub-protocol for 
producing LTP. Insofar as across their individual experiments they adhered tightly to this 
experimental design, they took themselves to be producing, measuring and detecting the 
same phenomenon across all of the experiments that had identical protocols they undertook 
in the laboratory. In doing so, they abstracted away from certain differences across these 
different experiments—different experimental subjects (e.g., rabbits, rats), different times 
of day in which the experiments were conducted, different stimulating and recording 
electrodes, different hippocampi, different perforant paths, different granule cells. Insofar 
as they regarded the data production processes across all of these experiments as reliable, 
they took themselves to be warranted in grouping the effects produced as instances of the 
same phenomenon. 
Yet, were Bliss and Lømo warranted in grouping the effects produced across their 
different LTP experiments as instances of the same kind of phenomenon? I think our 
intuition is to respond “yes” to this question in part because we assume that just so long as 
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the experimental process across these different experiments was reliable, then the 
mechanisms productive of the effects produced across them were sufficiently identical to 
be able to warrant classifying them as the same phenomenon (See Feest 2011 on the 
conditions under which phenomena are stabilized). When scientists make such judgments, 
they appear to be applying something like the NDR criterion; insofar as they think that the 
mechanisms across each experiment are identical or conserved, there are no grounds for 
splitting LTP into as many different kinds as there are LTP experiments. In other words, 
the scientists regard such abstractions away from the specific details of these experiments 
as legitimate just so long as they have good grounds for believing that the measures they 
have taken across experiments do serve to track or preserve real differences. Even though it 
is clear that conventional factors (i.e., decisions on the part of two investigators as to how 
to produce, detect and measure the phenomenon) are playing a role in shaping the kinds of 
phenomena discovered, there seems to be some sense in which the different instances 
grouped together constitute a bona fide kind of phenomenon from the perspective of the 
investigator(s).  
What happens, however, when we consider LTP research taking place after the 
publication of Bliss and Lømo’s 1973 paper? Immediately on the heels of their discovery, 
other neurophysiologists began producing what they regarded as forms of mammalian LTP 
in their laboratories. Bliss and Gardner-Medwin, for example, went  on  to demonstrate that 
same year that “the same phenomenon” could be produced “without anaesthesia and under 
normal more stable conditions which can be obtained using chronically prepared animals” 
(1973, 358). Robert Douglas and Graham Goddard sought to “repeat the observations of 
Bliss and Gardner-Medwin using the rat instead of the rabbit” but made “several 
modifications to the procedure” in order to “make the observed potentiation more reliable” 
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(1975, 206). By 1975, other neurophysiologists were producing LTP in their labs, using in 
vitro brain slice preparations (e.g., Deadwyler et al. 1975) and other novel 
electrophysiological recording techniques, including patch clamp (See Sweatt 2016). By 
1976, in vitro experiments had been used to produce LTP in three subregions of the 
hippocampus (CA1, CA3 and dentate gyrus), and “the time course of appearance, 
magnitude of the effect and duration of LTP appear[ed] to be similar in all 3 areas” (Alger 
& Teyler 1976, 469). In 1976, Gary Lynch, V. Gribkoff and S. Deadwyler published a 
letter to the journal Nature indicating that “hippocampal synapses” displayed “an unusual 
degree of physiological plasticity” and that the findings that “modest levels of repeated 
stimulation cause considerable enhancement in subsequent responses to single pulse 
stimulation” had “been replicated in several laboratories” (1976, 151).4 
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, the LTP field exploded exponentially. By 
1979, LTP at hippocampal synapses had become a model for understanding LTP in the 
nervous system more broadly and a lot of work was already being directed at uncovering 
the biochemical processes (e.g., second-messenger signaling cascades) and 
neurotransmitters (e.g., glutamate) involved in LTP at hippocampal synapses (e.g., 
Browning et al. 1979; Lynch et al.1979; Dunwiddie & Lynch 1979; Baudry and Lynch 
1980; Dolphin, Errington, Bliss 1982, 287). Different investigators used different 
stimulation paradigms and subprotocols, some that were intended to mimic “naturally 
occurring firing patterns, observed in vivo in the hippocampus” (e.g., theta-burst 
stimulation) and others that were used to induce LTP “by pairing repeated, single 
                                                            
4The general claim that persisted in the literature until 1986 was that “long-term potentiation [. . .] 
seen in several hippocampal pathways following repetitive stimulation, [was] somewhat unique when 
compared to the post-tetanic potentiation seen at the neuromuscular junction or in invertebrates” (Dunwiddie 
and Lynch 1978, 353-354) in so far that it was longer lasting. 
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presynaptic stimuli with postsynaptic membrane depolarization” (“so-called ‘pairing’ 
LTP”) (Sweatt 2016). 
I want to assume, for the sake of argument that investigators who engaged in this 
early LTP research regarded the instances of LTP they were producing in their own 
laboratories as bona fide instances of LTP, much like Bliss and Lomo did, and for similar 
reasons.  That is, with respect to each published research study, just so long as investigators 
had ensured the reliability of their LTP-producing experiments, they believed themselves 
justified in thinking that they had stabilized a single kind of phenomenon in their own 
laboratories. However, if we compare and contrast different features of these 
experiments—different experimental subjects (rabbits, rats, guinea pigs), different 
stimulation paradigms and protocols for producing LTP, different preparations (in vitro, in 
vivo), different time course with respect to how long the potentiated effect lasted, it 
becomes difficult to assess whether all of these separate laboratory effects are instances of 
the same phenomenon or different phenomena. Are the mechanisms across experiments 
that use different model organisms, different hippocampal synapses or different stimulation 
paradigms and protocols or different preparations all the same? 
In the 1970s and 80s, investigators did not have answers to these questions.5 Not 
enough was known about the cellular and molecular mechanisms of LTP, nor whether 
cellular and molecular activity differed depending upon the organisms being investigated or 
stimulus parameters and preparations being used. In response to such uncertainties, some 
investigators qualified the kind of LTP they were investigating by pointing to differences in 
the stimulation paradigms, animals and preparations used (in vivo, in vitro), and/or the 
                                                            
5They still lack answers, as I explain later in this section. 
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synapses at which LTP-inducing stimuli had been delivered.6 Other investigators, at least 
prior to 1986, seemed amenable to the idea that despite these kinds of differences, the same 
phenomenon was under study at least across all hippocampal LTP experiments (e.g., 
Dunwiddie, Madison and Lynch 1978; Lynch et al. 1978). In other words, there was no real 
consensus as to how to “lump” or “split” the phenomena. Given that LTP research was, 
from 1973-1988, in what some reviewers later characterized as “a descriptive phase” (See 
for e.g., Nicoll, Kauer and Malenka 1988, 97)—a phase in which little was being learned 
about the mechanisms of LTP—this general lack of consensus about how to “lump” or 
“split” the phenomena makes sense (See also Craver 2003). 
By 1988, LTP research had entered “a mechanistic phase” and results from a series 
of experiments that involved blockade of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors at 
different LTP synapses were taken to establish that LTP at mossy fiber synapses did not 
require activation of NMDA-receptors (e.g, Harris and Cotman 1986; Staubli 1992).7 This 
prompted investigators to split the category of hippocampal LTP into two broad 
subcategories: NMDA-receptor dependent and NMDA-receptor independent LTP (See also 
Nicoll, Kauer and Malenka 1988; Nicoll and Malenka 1995). Notice that this suggests that 
there is some sense in which neurobiologists were upholding something like the NDR 
                                                            
6Bliss and Gardner-Medwin, for example, acknowledged,  “the mechanisms of the effect 
remain uncertain” (Bliss and Gardner-Medwin 1973, 373). Douglas and Goddard were careful to 
indicate, “this type of potentiation may underlie memory storage in one part of the mammalian 
brain”5  (1975, 214) rather than at all mammalian cortical synapses. While some investigators 
regarded “intracellular recordings from in vitro preparations of both immature and mature 
hippocampal tissue” as “similar to those obtained in vivo” (Deadwyler et al. 1975, 80), one early 
failure to obtain LTP in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus was attributed to the possibility that 
in vitro slice preparations could compromise the integrity of the synaptic pathways (Deadwyler et 
al., 1975, 84) and result in a “decreased amount of recurring excitation” compared to in vivo 
preparations (Alger & Teyler 1976, 478). By 1978, Dunwiddie and Lynch determined that “various 
conditioning frequencies apparently induce[d] different  degrees of long-term  potentiation” 
(Dunwiddie  and Lynch 1978, 366) and that synaptic transmission was required for the initiation  of 
LTP (Dunwiddie, Madison & Lynch 413). 
7Ursula Staubli, for example, claimed “mossy fiber potentiation is unlike LTP both in 
induction and expression mechanisms and thus is a wholly different form of synaptic plasticity” 
(Staubli 1992, 151). 
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criterion—given the discovery that LTP could be produced with and without NMDA 
receptor activation, the hippocampal LTP category was split.  
By 1994, investigators had begun to acknowledge that “LTP [could] be induced in 
many different synaptic pathways by a variety of induction paradigms, and” that “the 
biochemical mechanisms of these forms of LTP may differ” (e.g., Powell et al. 1994). 
Despite such admissions, some investigators still grouped results from different 
experiments together in order to make general claims about specific forms of LTP. For 
example, in 1999, Robert Malenka and Roger Nicoll found it necessary to restrict the focus 
of their review to LTP induced at “synapses between the Schaffer collateral and 
commissural axons and the apical dendrites of CA1 pyramidal cells” (1999, 1870). They 
also acknowledged that because “a review of the literature generates an enormous, even 
bewildering, list of candidate signal transduction molecules” involved in LTP at these 
synapses, they were focusing only on those results concerning the mechanisms of this form 
of LTP that they took to be “compelling” (1999, 1871). By 2003, concerns about whether 
the mechanisms of different forms of NMDA-receptor dependent LTP (alone) differed 
depending upon the LTP stimulation paradigms and protocols used were prevalent in the 
LTP community. Specifically, Robert Malenka pointed to what was then becoming “the 
increasingly popular hypothesis that different LTP induction protocols result in 
mechanistically distinct types of NMDA receptor-dependent LTP”, which was “often used 
as a polite explanation for discrepancy in results between [research] groups”. Although 
Malenka suggested that “the evidence in support of this idea remain[ed] weak”; he 
acknowledged that “it will remain important to seriously consider the possibility that the 
patterns of activity that are used to elicit LTP influence which intracellular signalling 
cascades are activated” (Malenka 2003, 925; See also Nicoll and Malenka 2004). The 
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following year, Malenka and Mark Bear indicated that “when discussing LTP [. . .] it is 
now necessary to define at which specific synapses these phenomena are being studied, at 
what time point during development, and how they are being triggered (Malenka and Bear 
2004, 5). As partial indication that such issues have not yet been fully resolved, Baudry and 
colleagues recently claimed,  “as has been repeatedly mentioned, a major difficulty to 
integrate all the findings” about LTP “is due in part to the use of different experimental 
protocols by the majority of research laboratories working on this topic, and the apparent 
lack of reproducibility of experimental data resulting from these differences” (2015, 74). 
Given even these spotty details of the history of LTP, an interesting picture emerges 
with respect to the kinds of constraints that have to date informed the development of a 
taxonomy (or lack thereof) of LTP. Over the course of a 43-year history, the published 
record included well over 6000 papers on LTP. If investigators had begun to treat each 
independent instance of LTP produced in a given laboratory as an independent 
phenomenon having an independent mechanism, they would have risked having to develop 
an unwieldy taxonomy containing as many different kinds of LTP as there were 
experiments for producing it. That clearly was not practical. So, researchers instead (at least 
in the context of review papers) abstracted away from specific details of experimental 
practice that may have led to differences in mechanisms in order to make the goal of 
providing a unified model of LTP or unified models of specific forms of LTP (e.g. 
hippocampal NMDA-receptor LTP in area CA1 tractable). Phenomena that may indeed 
have been produced by different mechanisms thus were sometimes treated as instances of 
the same phenomenon. 
However, notice that by treating different instances of LTP that may have had 
different mechanisms as all the same phenomenon, researchers abstracted away from 
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potentially relevant causal differences, which seems antithetical to the discovery of kinds 
that track real divisions in the causal structure of the world.8 
That such pragmatic factors were operative in the development of the LTP 
taxonomy remained hidden until recently, when more and more investigators began to 
reach consensus that maybe the forms of even hippocampal area CA1 LTP being produced 
in different laboratories were really different as opposed to the same phenomenon. The 
reason that they remained hidden, in part, is that there were discoveries, like the discovery 
of non-NMDA-receptor-dependent LTP that seemed to confirm the idea that LTP 
researchers were in search of natural kinds and inclined to uphold the NDR criterion. 
However, as I have demonstrated in this section, a closer look at LTP research reveals that 
pragmatic factors have played a prominent role in shaping the current taxonomy of LTP. 
4. Conclusion.  At the start of this chapter, I raised four questions to which I want to 
return in light of the aforementioned analysis. First, do LTP researchers take different 
instances of LTP produced across different experimental protocols to be the same kind of 
phenomenon or different phenomena?  I think there is widespread recognition that these 
different instances may not be the same phenomenon and that there is no real consensus 
about how to “lump” or “split” the phenomena. To cope with the vastness of the 
experimental record on LTP, some researchers have abstracted away from differences in 
experimental protocols in an attempt to provide unified mechanistic models of this or that 
specific form of LTP (e.g., Malenka and Nicoll 1999; Baudry et al. 2016). So, what kind of 
                                                            
8At the time of Bliss and Lomo’s discovery, LTP had been reliably produced in 
invertebrates across many different laboratories. Bliss and Lomo’s finding was different, because it 
was produced in the mammalian brain. Debates about whether the cellular and mechanisms for LTP 
induction were conserved across species persisted well into the 21st century (See for example 
Bickle 2003). It was common to hear some investigators arguing that LTP involved pre-synaptic 
mechanisms and others that it involved post- synaptic mechanisms. Support for conservation of 
mechanisms waxed and waned depending on the grain of analysis one used to assess similarities 
and differences in mechanisms across organisms (See Bechtel and Mundale 1999, Sullivan 2008; 
Craver 2009).  
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kinds are LTP researchers are aiming to discover? From one perspective it may indeed be 
accurate to say that investigators are interested in discovering the mechanisms of LTP and 
developing a taxonomy that corresponds to real divisions in kinds of LTP. However, the 
multiplicity of experimental protocols, combined with the fact that discovering mechanisms 
is a collaborative enterprise are factors that have contributed to neurobiologists having to 
make pragmatic decisions as to how to lump or split the phenomena.  
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